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Abstract
If the asset market is complete then the dierence between foreign and domestic
agents' log intertemporal marginal rates of substitution (IMRSs) equals the log change
in the real exchange rate. This equation is frequently used to argue that changes in real
exchange rates reect dierences between agents' required compensation for exposure
to asset return uncertainty. We show that the relative returns on frictionlessly traded
assets are only reected in the common component of agents' IMRSs, not dierences.
Instead, when this equation does oer insights, frictions in the goods market are the
source of economic distinction between agents.
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If the asset market is complete then the log change in the real exchange rate equals








log change in the real
domestic/foreign exchange rate
. (1)
Brandt, Cochrane, and Santa-Clara (2006) refer to Eq. (1) as the asset market view of ex-
change rates.1 It is now a dominant theoretical framework in the recent international asset
pricing literature and has been used to understand exchange rate determination, foreign ex-
change risk premia, and international risk sharing.2 For a recent survey of this literature,
see Lustig and Verdelhan (2012).
We oer a critique of this framework. The dierence between agents' log IMRSs is
often interpreted as the dierence between their required compensation for exposure to the
uncertainty in asset returns. However, this economic interpretation does not account for any
dierence in units over which agents' IMRSs are expressed. When Eq. (1) holds, we show
that the foreign and domestic agents actually require the same, not dierent, compensation
for exposure to asset return uncertainty.
Therefore, structural assumptions about preferences and goods market frictions are nec-
essary to interpret variation in real exchange rates as dierences between agents' IMRSs. For
example, suppose that the asset market is complete and agents in dierent economies have
the same consumption aggregators over individual goods. With these assumptions, frictions
in the goods market are the only source of economic distinction between agents, and the
amount of variation in the real exchange rate reects the degree to which this risk in the
goods market is not shared across these economies. However, there is an important observa-
tional equivalence problem. We show that the same real exchange rate behavior can result
if the asset market is complete and goods markets are frictionless, but agents have dierent
preferences over individual goods. In this case, agents share risk perfectly. Thus, armed
1In a distinct earlier literature, the asset market view of exchange rates referred to the role of asset
markets and capital mobility in exchange rate determination. This literature emphasized the importance of
the fact that nominal exchange rates and asset markets adjust much more quickly than goods markets. See,
for example, Dornbusch (1976), Frenkel (1976), Kouri (1976), and Mussa (1976).
2Examples of papers where this approach appears include: Bansal (1997); Backus, Foresi, and Telmer
(2001); Brandt and Santa-Clara (2002); Smith and Wickens (2002); Ahn (2004); Brandt, Cochrane, and
Santa-Clara (2006); Lustig and Verdelhan (2006); Brennan and Xia (2006); Lustig and Verdelhan (2007);
Bakshi, Carr, and Wu (2008); Verdelhan (2010); Colacito and Croce (2011); Lustig, Roussanov, and Verdel-
han (2011); Bansal and Shaliastovich (2013); and Lustig, Roussanov, and Verdelhan (2014).
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only with asset returns, exchange rates, and aggregate consumption data, it is impossible to
dierentiate between models in which agents share risk perfectly and ones where they don't.
Although our paper is a critique, a positive message from it is that structural modeling is
helpful if it is specic about goods markets and preferences over disaggregated consumption,
and brings relevant evidence to bear.
1 The Asset Market View of Exchange Rates
To facilitate comparisons across economies, consider a frictionlessly traded basket of assets
and/or goods and services that serves as a common numeraire. In the domestic economy, let
Pd,t be the number of units of this numeraire that can be traded for one unit of the domestic
representative agent's consumption basket of goods and services at time t. Likewise, let Pf,t
be the number of numeraire units that can be traded for one unit of the foreign agent's
consumption basket at time t in the foreign economy.
The real domestic/foreign exchange rate, et = Pf,t/Pd,t, is the price of a unit of the foreign
agent's consumption basket, expressed in units of the domestic agent's consumption basket.
Any frictionlessly traded numeraire yields the same real exchange rate. Let Xt be the gross
change in the real exchange rate from time t− 1 to t. Then,
Xt = et/et−1 = δd,t/δf,t , where δd,t = Pd,t−1/Pd,t and δf,t = Pf,t−1/Pf,t . (2)
The real exchange rate is constant if the composition of agents' consumption baskets is
identical, and they face the same prices for all goods and services (i.e., purchasing power
parity holds across these economies). Therefore, the real exchange rate only varies over time
if at least one of these conditions is violated.
Consider an arbitrage-free set of k assets that can be frictionlessly traded across these
economies. Let Rηt denote the vector of gross returns on these assets, from time t − 1 to t,
denominated in units of our numeraire. Then the gross asset returns, denominated in units









For concreteness (and without loss of generality), a portfolio of the assets themselves can
serve as our common numeraire, so long as its gross return is almost surely strictly positive.
2
Let η be a vector of portfolio weights for such a numeraire, in which case Rηt is the vector of
gross asset returns relative to the gross return on this portfolio. Then δd,t and δf,t equal the
gross return on this numeraire portfolio, denominated in units of the domestic and foreign
consumption baskets, respectively. That is,







where a · b denotes the dot product of vectors a and b.
Let Md,t be the domestic agent's IMRS, between time t − 1 and t, expressed over units
of her consumption basket of goods and services. Likewise, let M∗f,t be the foreign agent's
IMRS over units of his consumption basket during this period. Since the agents can trade
the assets, their IMRSs must satisfy the well-known rst order (Euler) conditions







In Eq. (5), 1 is a vector of 1's and E [·] denotes expectation conditional on information
available at time t − 1 (for notational convenience, we drop the explicit dependence on the
time t− 1 information set).
When expressed over units of our common numeraire, the agents' IMRSs must equal




f,t δf,t . (6)
The change of numeraire units in Eqs. (3) and (6) preserves agents' pricing of asset return






















Therefore, the log dierence between agents' required compensation for exposure to asset





f,t − lnMd,t − lnXt . (8)
Importantly, this dierence does not depend on the particular choice of frictionlessly traded
numeraire that is used as a common basis for comparison across agents, since any such
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numeraire yields the same real exchange rate.
According to the asset market view, when Eq. (1) holds, the change in the real exchange
rate reects the dierence between the foreign and domestic agents' required compensation
for exposure to asset return uncertainty. However, Eq. (1) holds whenMηd,t = M
η
f,t in Eq. (8),
so these agents actually require the same, not dierent, compensation for exposure to the
uncertainty in asset returns. Instead, the change in the real exchange rate simply reects the
dierence in units  dierent consumption baskets of goods and services, and/or dierent
prices for the components of those baskets  over which agents' IMRSs (and the asset returns)
are expressed. This point is our main critique of the asset market view of exchange rates.
Thus, to draw conclusions from Eq. (1) about meaningful economic distinctions between
agents, we must make further assumptions about the underlying economic environment
beyond the asset market structure. In particular, as we show in Section 4, exchange rate
data, together with Eq. (1), can be used to draw important distinctions between domestic
and foreign agents if we further assume that they have the same consumption aggregators
over individual goods and there are goods market frictions. However, regardless of any
additional assumptions about goods markets, it still remains that the foreign and domestic
agents' require the same compensation for exposure to asset return uncertainty whenever
Eq. (1) holds.
1.1 Stochastic Discount Factors (SDFs)
Eq. (1) also characterizes a change of units for a stochastic discount factor (SDF). An SDF
for Rt is dened as an almost surely strictly positive random variable, Mt > 0, such that
1 = E [MtRt] . (9)
From Eq. (5), Md,t andM
∗
f,t are examples of SDFs for Rt and R
∗
t , respectively. From Eq. (7),




f,t δf,t are both examples of SDFs for R
η
t .
Eq. (1) holds if and only if Mηd,t = M
η
f,t, in which case Md,t and M
∗
f,t are the same SDF,
simply denominated in dierent units. That is, dropping the subscripts on agents' IMRSs,
Mt is an SDF for Rt = XtR
∗
t if and only M
∗
t = MtXt is an SDF for R
∗
t , and vice versa.
1.2 Illustrative Example: Complete Asset Markets
Before closing out this section, we demonstrate how our critique applies to the special case
of complete asset markets, which is the canonical example upon which the asset market view
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of exchange rates is based.
A set of asset returns is a complete market for an agent if: (i) there are no events over
which the agent's IMRS varies, but the asset returns do not; and (ii) there is a unique SDF
within the space of SDFs that can be expressed as a function of those asset returns (or,
more precisely, there is a unique SDF within the space of SDFs that are measurable with
respect to the σ-algebra generated by those asset returns). Thus, if the asset returns are
a complete market for both the foreign and domestic agents, then their IMRSs are equal
(when expressed over a common numeraire that is frictionlessly traded) and Eq. (1) holds.
If the asset market is complete then we can explicitly characterize the agents' IMRSs.




−1 , where θ? = arg max
θ·1=1





= 1 . (10)
Karatzas and Kardaras (2007) prove that this SDF always exists (whenever there is an SDF
that satises Eq. 9). Therefore, if the asset market is complete for the foreign and domestic
agents, then Mηt in Eq. (10) is the unique SDF for R
η











− ln (Rηt · θ?)− ln δd,t︸ ︷︷ ︸
− ln(Rt·θ?)
. (11)
Recall that, according to the asset market view of exchange rates, the dierence between
agents' log IMRSs is economically interpreted as the dierence between their required com-
pensation for exposure to asset return uncertainty. However, this required compensation is
captured by lnMηt = − ln (R
η
t · θ?), which is common to both agents' log IMRSs. Instead,
any dierence between their IMRSs, ln δd,t− ln δf,t = lnXt, simply reects the dierent units
over which their IMRSs (and the asset returns) are expressed.
2 Economic Interpretation of SDFs in Ane Models
In this section we demonstrate how our critique applies to the large literature that uses
reduced-form ane models of two (or more) log SDFs to characterize and economically
interpret currency returns as dierences between agents' IMRSs.3
3A few examples of papers that pursue this modeling approach include: Backus, Foresi, and Telmer
(2001); Brandt and Santa-Clara (2002); Bakshi, Carr, and Wu (2008); Lustig, Roussanov, and Verdelhan
(2011); and Lustig, Roussanov, and Verdelhan (2014).
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To begin, we extend our earlier notation to a setting with ` ≥ 2 dierent economies. Let
X it denote the gross change in the ith real exchange rate (expressed in units of the domestic
consumption basket per unit of the consumption basket in the ith foreign economy). Let Mt
and M it be SDFs that price the asset returns denominated in units of the domestic and ith
foreign consumption baskets, respectively. Let rt and r
i
t denote the one-period continuously-
compounded real interest rates on default-free bank accounts in the domestic and ith foreign
economy, respectively. Finally, let X t, M
∗
t , and r
∗
t denote (`− 1) × 1 vectors with ith
elements X it , M
i
t , and r
i
t respectively.
In this literature, the dynamics of SDFs for asset returns denominated in units of the `
dierent economies are frequently modeled as
lnMt = −rt−1 − λεt − 12λλ





where superscript > denotes the transpose of a matrix or vector, and diag (·) denotes the
main diagonal vector a matrix. In Eq. (12), εt ∼ N (0, I) is a k × 1 vector of independent
standard normals, λ is a 1 × k vector, and Λ∗ is an (`− 1) × k matrix. For notational
convenience, we suppress any time/state dependence of the parameters (i.e., λ ≡ λt and
Λ∗ ≡ Λ∗t ). If the change of units, lnX t = lnM ∗t − 1 lnMt, holds for Mt andM ∗t in Eq. (12)
then the log returns on default-free bank accounts in the foreign economies, denominated in
domestic consumption units, are given by










+ Σ εt , where Σ = 1λ− Λ∗ . (13)
In the literature we critique, the reduced-form SDFs in Eq. (12) are often assumed to equal
the IMRSs of representative agents in the domestic and foreign economies. λ is economically
interpreted as the compensation that agents in the domestic economy require for exposure
to the vector of asset return shocks, εt. Likewise, the ith row of Λ
∗ is interpreted as the
prices of risk that agents in the ith foreign economy assign to these shocks. According to this
economic interpretation of Eqs. (12) and (13), both the volatility and expected excess return
on foreign currency investments reect heterogeneity across agents in dierent economies in
the compensation they require for exposure to these asset market shocks.
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2.1 Example: Lustig, Roussanov, and Verdelhan (2014)
Lustig, Roussanov, and Verdelhan (2014) is a recent and representative example in the
literature that we critique. They document that currency returns can be explained by a
small set of currency factors (i.e., dynamic long/short portfolios of currencies). To interpret
these empirical results, they provide a reduced-form ane model of agents' IMRSs that is

























0 · · · · · · 0 λ` λ`+1 λ`+2
]
. (14b)
Lustig, Roussanov, and Verdelhan (2014) interpret the last two latent shocks in their
model, ε`+1t and ε
`+2
t , as global shocks because agents in all economies require (possibly
dierent) compensation for exposure to these risks. By contrast, the rst ` latent shocks 
ε1t , . . ., ε
`
t  are viewed as country-specic because only agents in a single economy require
compensation for bearing each of these risks. They argue that various properties of currency
(portfolio) returns reect heterogeneity across agents in dierent economies in their required
compensation for exposure to these local and global asset market shocks.4
2.2 Critique Applied to Ane Models
To see how our critique applies to this literature, let Rηt denote the vector of gross returns,
denominated in units of our numeraire, on a set of k non-redundant assets that are priced
by the SDFs in Eq. (12). Then Rit = δf,tR
η
t are these asset returns, denominated in the
consumption units of the ith foreign economy, where δi,t = Pi,t/Pi,t−1, and Pi,t is the number
of numeraire units that can be traded for one unit of the representative agent's consumption
4For example, Lustig, Roussanov, and Verdelhan (2014, p. 537) state that Accounting for the variation
in expected currency excess returns across dierent currencies requires variation in the SDFs' exposures to
the common innovation. ... Lustig, Roussanov, and Verdelhan (2011) show that permanent heterogeneity
in loadings ... is necessary to explain the variation in unconditional expected returns (why high interest
rate currencies tend not to depreciate on average), whereas the transitory heterogeneity in loadings ... is
necessary to match the variation in conditional expected returns (why currencies with currently high interest
rates tend to appreciate).
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t are these asset
returns, denominated in domestic consumption units.
For tractability, given the ane log SDFs in Eq. (12), the vector of log returns on these
assets are typically assumed to also be ane functions of the latent shocks, εt. If these log
asset returns span this vector of shocks, then we can invert this relationship and express
the shocks as ane functions of the log asset returns. Substituting this inversion back into
Eq. (12), the log SDFs can be expressed as ane functions of the log returns,
lnMt = c−Υ · lnRt and lnM it = ci −Υi · lnRit , ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , `− 1} , (15)




t − lnMt, for each pair of SDFs
in Eq. (15) implies that
lnM it = lnMt + lnX
i
t = c−Υ ·
(
lnRt − 1 lnX it
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
lnRit
+ (1−Υ · 1) lnX it . (16)
Comparing the expressions for lnM it in Eqs. (15) and (16) give us
ci = c , Υi = Υ , and Υ · 1 = 1 , ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , `− 1} . (17)
Therefore, the SDFs in Eq. (12) can be written equivalently as
lnMt =
lnMηt︷ ︸︸ ︷
c −Υ · lnRηt − ln δd,t︸ ︷︷ ︸
−Υ·lnRt
and lnM it =
lnMηt︷ ︸︸ ︷
c −Υ · lnRηt − ln δi,t︸ ︷︷ ︸
−Υ·lnRit
. (18)
Again, contrary to the claims in this literature, the relative asset returns (including currency
returns) are only reected in the common component of these SDFs, which is lnMηt =
c−Υ · lnRηt . The dierence, ln δd,t − ln δi,t = lnX it , instead reects the dierent units used
to denominate the asset returns.


















Moreover, this characterization of c can be symmetrically expressed using the asset returns
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denominated in the domestic and foreign consumption baskets, since
Υ · 1 = 1 ⇒ e−Υ·lnRtRt = e−Υ·lnR
η
tRηt = e
−Υ·lnRitRit , ∀i . (20)
In many cases we can explicitly solve for c and Υ in Eq. (18). To illustrate, suppose the
last asset is a default-free bank account, denominated in domestic consumption units, that
pays continuously-compounded interest rt−1. If the gross returns on the other k − 1 assets,










µ− 1rt−1 + 12 diag (Ω)
]>
Ω−1 . (22)
As a concrete example, if Σ = 1λ−Λ∗ in Eq. (13) is non-singular, and k = `−1, then the
log returns on the domestic and foreign bank accounts completely span the vector of shocks,
εt. In this case,
lnRt =
[
r∗t−1 + lnX t
rt−1
]







, and Ω = ΣΣ> . (23)
Therefore,








, where Σ = 1λ− Λ∗ . (24)
2.3 Implications of No-Arbitrage
The dynamics of short-term interest rates can also be included in models of the form in
Eq. (12), in which case the model will have no-arbitrage implications for the term structure
of interest rates in the domestic and foreign economies. However, Eq. (12) does not impose
any such overidentifying restrictions.
A particularly well-known paper in this literature is Backus, Foresi, and Telmer (2001)
who characterize the (forward premium) anomaly in the context of ane models of the
term structure of interest rates.5 The restrictions they derive are not actually due to
5In contrast to much of the literature, Backus, Foresi, and Telmer (2001) are careful not to interpret the
SDFs in their model as the IMRSs of domestic and foreign representative agents.
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Eqs. (12) and (13), but instead reect an implicit spanning assumption. The intuition can
be understood as follows. Any dynamic no-arbitrage model of the term structure of interest
rates in two economies must have at least four assets: short- and long-term bonds in both
economies. With four assets, there are three relative returns to consider. However, Backus,
Foresi, and Telmer (2001) assume that those three relative returns are driven by only two
shocks, in which case one (or a portfolio) of the three assets must be redundant, since it
can be replicated by a combination of the other two. It is this redundancy, not the forward
premium anomaly or Eqs. (12) and (13), that is the source of the restrictions they derive.
It is also important to recognize that Eq. (1) does not imply that a foreign currency return
is a redundant asset that can be replicated by a combination of other assets. For example,
Ahn (2004) provides a model in which shocks to real exchange rates are not completely
spanned by the shocks that drive bond returns denominated in local units. The model in
Lustig, Roussanov, and Verdelhan (2014) also has this feature.6
3 Restrictions in Reduced-Form Models
Beyond the economic interpretation of SDFs, some papers in the literature we critique suggest
that the change of units in Eq. (1) also imposes restrictions on reduced-form models of
currency returns. It does not. In this section we show that the restrictions in these papers
are actually errors.
3.1 SDFs for Dierent Sets of Assets
Brennan and Xia (2006) test whether the change of units, lnX t = lnM
∗
t −1 lnMt, holds for
SDFs,Mt andM
∗
t , that they estimate to only price domestic and foreign bonds, respectively.
However, this test is not motivated by theory, since the change of units only applies to SDFs
that price the same set of assets. To demonstrate this point with a simple counterexample,
note that lnMt = −rt−1 and lnM ∗t = −r∗t−1 are log SDFs that only price domestic and
foreign one-period default-free bank account returns denominated in local units. However,
if the exchange rate is not determined prior to time t (i.e., it is stochastic), then
6In Lustig, Roussanov, and Verdelhan (2014), a single shock, ε`+2t , drives all of the variation in the `− 1
exchange rates that is independent of changes in the term structure of interest rates in those economies. In




t , while the








t also drive time-
variation in λii and λ`, while ε
`+1




`+2. Given this dependence,
the term structure of interest rates in each economy is determined by no-arbitrage, and is driven by the same
two shocks that drive short-term interest rates in that economy.
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lnX t 6= lnM ∗t − 1 lnMt = 1rt−1 − r∗t−1 . (25)
3.2 Minimum Variance Projections
Let β · Rt be the linear projection of the domestic representative agent's IMRS onto the
asset returns denominated in domestic consumption units. Likewise, let β∗ · R∗t be the
linear projection of the foreign representative agent's IMRS onto the asset returns in foreign
consumption units. Brandt, Cochrane, and Santa-Clara (2006, p. 675) claim that β ·RtXt is
always in the linear span of R∗t , which implies that Eq. (1) generalizes to incomplete markets
if we replace agents' IMRSs with these minimum variance projections.7 In general, this
claim is not correct. Instead, it is β ·Rt/Xt, not β ·RtXt, that is always in the linear span
of R∗t = Rt/Xt.
8 If the asset market is incomplete then, for any given β there does not
generally exist β∗ such that β∗ ·R∗t = β ·RtXt, and therefore,
lnXt 6= lnβ∗ ·R∗t − lnβ ·Rt . (26)
3.3 Incomplete Markets




ln Ξt = lnM
∗
t − lnMt − lnXt 6= 0. (27)
However, they claim that Ξt is independent of Mt and M
∗





This claim violates no arbitrage because it implies that their model assigns two dierent
returns to the same default-free domestic currency bank account. To prove this result, note
that M∗tR
∗
t = MtΞtRt. Therefore Mt and MtΞt must both price the asset returns, Rt,










7Lustig and Verdelhan (2012, p. 395) also make this claim in their survey chapter.
8In the appendix of their paper, Brandt, Cochrane, and Santa-Clara (2006) provide a specic example
with complete asset markets in which β ·RtXt is in the linear span of R∗t . However, this result does not hold
true in general if markets are incomplete (which is the relevant case required to prove their desired result).
9See Eq. (24) in Brandt and Santa-Clara (2002, p. 176). They state that the key insight of our model
is that when markets are incomplete, the volatility of the exchange rate is not uniquely determined by the
domestic and foreign stochastic discount factors. ... If markets are incomplete, the volatility of the exchange
rate can contain an element that is orthogonal to the priced sources of risk in both countries. ... To capture
this excess volatility, we specify a stochastic process for the degree of market incompleteness.
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However, if Ξt is independent of Mt and M
∗


















3.4 Market Completeness in Reduced-Form Models
In reduced-form models of asset returns, there is a unique SDF (or, equivalently, a unique
pricing measure) if and only if any contingent claim on the assets can be exactly replicated by
a (dynamic) portfolio of the assets.11 Since reduced-form models focus exclusively on asset
returns, the SDFs in these models can only be unique within the space of SDFs that are
measurable with respect to the σ-algebra generated by these returns. The binomial tree and
Black-Scholes-Merton models are perhaps the best known examples of reduced-form models
with SDFs that are unique in this sense.12
While the unique SDFs in these reduced-form models are useful for pricing and hedging
contingent claims (e.g., options), they do not necessarily equal the IMRS of a representative
agent in Eq. (1). For example, when there is a unique reduced-form SDF for the asset returns
denominated in domestic consumption units, it can be expressed as lnMt = − ln (Rt · θ?).
However, the domestic agent's IMRS could be Md,t = ζtMt, where ζt is a random variable
that is independent of Rt with E [ζt] = 1. In this case,Md,t is an SDF for Rt, but the agent's
IMRS varies over states of the world, captured by ζt, that the asset returns do not (i.e., Md,t
is not measurable with respect to the σ-algebra generated by Rt).
Thus, an SDF in a reduced-form model can only be economically interpreted as the IMRS
of a representative agent under the additional assumption that there are no events (i.e., states
of the world) over which the agent's IMRS varies, but the asset returns in the model do not.
This additional assumption is common in more structural models (with agents) because it
makes them much easier to solve. However, it is not a common assumption in reduced-form
10Similarly, Anderson, Hammond, and Ramezani (2010) show that, in the special case of an ane setting,
the assumptions in Brandt and Santa-Clara (2002) are infeasible. Eq. (29) illustrates that the internal
inconsistency (i.e., the arbitrage opportunity) applies more generally, beyond the specic ane structure.
11See the seminal work by Harrison and Kreps (1979) and Harrison and Pliska (1981, 1983).
12For details on the binomial tree model, see Cox, Ross, and Rubinstein (1979). For the Black-Scholes-
Merton model, see Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973). The discrete-time (continuous state space)
model in Eqs. (12) and (13) is an example of a reduced-form model that does not have a unique SDF; for
example, Long's SDF in Eq. (10) is another, dierent SDF that is also consistent with the asset return
dynamics. However, the continuous-time limit of Eq. (12) is a continuous diusion and in that case, Υ in
Eq. (18) is equal to θ? in Eq. (10).
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models (outside of the international asset pricing literature). In fact, the primary appeal
of reduced-form models is that one is free to model the relative returns on a subset of the
assets available to trade, and can be agnostic about any variation in agents' IMRSs that is
independent of the returns on those (or any other) assets.
4 Models with Agents and Risk Sharing
We now turn to a discussion of models in which there are two agents, who reside, respectively,
in the domestic and foreign economies. In Section 4.1 we highlight the model elements that
are particularly relevant for our subsequent discussion. In Section 4.2 we characterize the
conditions under which variation in the real exchange rate directly reects imperfect risk
sharing. In Section 4.3 we show that asset returns can be informative about the amount of
risk shared between agents, but not about the amount of unshared risk. Finally, in Section
4.4, we work with a simple model motivated by Backus and Smith (1993), to show that
fundamentally dierent models of real exchange rates can be observationally equivalent at
the level of aggregate consumption data.
4.1 Model Highlights
We describe an economy with two countries (domestic and foreign), each with a represen-
tative agent. Utility is dened over n individual consumption goods, which are indexed by
j = 1, 2, . . . , n. All goods are perishable and both agents are price takers. Time is discrete,
and indexed by t, but we suppress date subscripts unless strictly necessary.





d, · · · , cnd)], (30)
where cjd is her consumption of good j, cd(·) is a homogeneous of degree one quasi-concave
function of its arguments, and u is a monotonic function with standard properties. The





f , · · · , cnf )], (31)
where cjf is his consumption of good j, and cf (·) is a homogeneous of degree one quasi-
concave function of its arguments. For convenience we assume that the utility functions
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over the aggregate are the same, but that the consumption aggregators, cd and cf may be
dierent.
Both economies are cashless and use good 1 as the numeraire, which is assumed to be
frictionlessly traded. Our model would have the same implications for the real exchange
rate if we chose dierent numeraires. Goods markets meet sequentially. Goods may or may
not be frictionlessly traded, so prices for those goods may dier across the economies. Price
dierences might be the result of physical trading costs (in the extreme, some goods might be
nontraded) or might stem from price discrimination by producers. The domestic and foreign
prices of good j are, respectively, P jd and P
j
f . For any good that is frictionlessly traded, its
price must be the same in both countries:
P jd = P
j
f . (32)
Given that good 1 is the numeraire, P 1d = P
1
f = 1.
Let M jd,t denote the domestic agent's IMRS, and M
j
f,t denote the foreign agent's IMRS,
dened over units of an individual good, j, between periods t − 1 and t. Later, we assume
that lifetime utility is additively time separable, with a discount factor, 0 < β < 1, so




d,t−1]. However, for most of this section, lifetime
utility can take on a number of dierent forms with the same results going through.
We assume that both agents have access to a nancial market in which k assets, priced
in units of the numeraire, are frictionlessly traded. In any model where the asset market
is complete M1d,t = M
1
f,t. This follows from the fact that an economy in which the asset
market is complete is equivalent to one in which there is a complete set of state-contingent
claims. In such an economy, both agents optimally set, on a state-by-state basis, the IMRS
between units of the numeraire at t and t − 1 equal to the price, at t − 1, of a claim to a
unit of the numeraire in each possible state at time t. This result is standard and does not
depend on details of the utility function or the rest of the economic environment, such as
the production structure. In a more general model where the asset market is incomplete,
there will be some time periods or states of the world in whichM1d,t 6= M1f,t. We nd it useful




d,t, with deviations of Ξt from 1 reecting the degree of asset market
incompleteness.
In a model where households are price takers, the marginal rate of substitution between
good j and good 1 is optimally set equal to the price of good j, given that good 1 is the


























If trade in good j is frictionlessor in other words, if purchasing power parity (PPP) holds
for good j, then P jd,t = P
j
f,t for all t, and the price change terms drop out of the equation.
Denition. The domestic and foreign agents share risk perfectly if M jf,t = M
j
d,t for all j, t.
Colacito and Croce (2011, p. 156) also adopt this denition of perfect risk sharing, which
states that the domestic and foreign agents equate IMRSs over all individual goods and
services at every point in time. It is not equivalent to asset markets being complete, which
would only imply that Ξt = 1 for all t. Nor is it equivalent to an allocation that coincides
with the solution to a social planner's problem that respects goods market frictions. In either
of these situations, risk sharing will be as good as it can be, but any market frictions that
result in a wedge between P jd,t and P
j
f,t, for some j, prevent IMRSs over some goods being
equated. Our denition means that risk sharing is perfect in a model with complete asset
markets and frictionless trade in all goods.
IMRSs may also be dened over consumption baskets rather than individual consumption
goods. We let Md,t denote the domestic agent's IMRS dened over units of her consumption
basket, and M∗f,t denote the foreign agent's IMRS, dened over units of his consumption
basket. We use an asterisk to denote the foreign agent's IMRS because the foreign agent
may have dierent preferences over individual goods than the domestic agent. This would
imply that the two IMRSs are expressed in dierent units. Given that the agents' baskets
are homogeneous of degree one aggregates of their consumption of individual goods, the
prices of these baskets (in some common numeraire) may be written as homogenous of





d , · · · ) and Pf = Hf (P 1f , P 2f , · · · ), with the functional forms of Hd(·) and Hf (·)
being related to the functions cd(·) and cf (·) (see Varian, 1984). The subscripts on these
functions allow for the possibility that the agents' preferences dier. At the level of aggregate
consumption the equation that corresponds to Eq. (33) is
M∗f,t
Md,t
= ΞtXt , (34)
where Xt = et/et−1 and et = Pf,t/Pd,t.
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4.2 Risk Sharing and Variation in Real Exchange Rates
When agents have the same consumption aggregator, Hd = Hf = H, the real exchange rate









for all j, t. Therefore, if agents have the same consumption aggregator and goods markets
are frictionless, et = 1 and Xt = 1 for all t. If we observe real exchange rate variation, it
necessarily implies that either markets for some goods are not frictionless or agents have
dierent consumption aggregators (or both).
Does a variable real exchange rate, by itself, directly reect imperfect risk sharing?
Brandt, Cochrane, and Santa-Clara (2006) argue very strongly that the answer is always yes.
Table 1 summarizes our answer to this question, and as the table indicates, it depends on
underlying assumptions about the economic environment. The answer is yes if we assume
that asset markets are complete, and that agents have identical consumption aggregators.
With these assumptions, Ξt = 1 and variation in Xt (due to variation in the real exchange







f,t−1 for some j. The existence of such wedges, in turn, necessarily
implies imperfect risk sharing.
Under any of the other combinations of assumptions shown in Table 1, however, the
answer is no. For example, in the northeast corner of the table, asset markets are assumed
to be complete, but preferences over goods dier (Hd 6= Hf ). In this case, perfect risk sharing
and real exchange rate variation are compatible, because we can have M jd,t = M
j
f,t for all j,
t, even when Md,t 6= M∗f,t.
Nature of
Consumption Aggregators
Asset Markets Identical Dierent
Complete Yes No
Incomplete No No
Table 1: Does a variable real exchange rate directly reect imperfect risk sharing?
In the bottom row of the table the answer is also no. When asset markets are incomplete,
or, more precisely, when Ξt 6= 1 for some t, then risk sharing is imperfect regardless of
the behavior of the real exchange rate. For example, goods markets could be frictionless
(implying that P jd,t = P
j
f,t for all j, t) and preferences over goods could be identical (with the




d,t = Ξt 6= 1
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for some t.
To summarize, there is no direct connection between risk sharing and real exchange rate
variation except in models where asset markets are complete and agents have identical con-
sumption aggregators. In that case, goods market frictions are the only source of dierence
between agents' IMRSs.
4.3 Asset Prices and Unshared Risks
In contrast to our discussion in the previous section, Brandt, Cochrane, and Santa-Clara
(2006) argue very strongly that real exchange rate variation is always informative about
risk sharing. In fact, they conclude that because real exchange rate variation is small com-
pared to Hansen and Jagannathan (1991) bounds on the volatility of domestic and foreign
SDFs, domestic and foreign marginal utility growths must be highly correlated, and risk
sharing must be better than you think. On page 673, Brandt, Cochrane, and Santa-Clara
(2006) emphasize that their conclusion is drawn by only using data on asset returns and real
exchange rates:
Yet the conclusion is hard to escape. Our calculation uses only price data, and
no quantity data or economic modeling (utility functions, income or productivity
shock processes, and so forth). A large degree of international risk sharing is an
inescapable logical conclusion of Eq. (1), a reasonably high equity premium (over
1%, as we show below), and the basic economic proposition that price ratios
measure marginal rates of substitution.
To understand why Brandt, Cochrane, and Santa-Clara (2006) draw this dierent conclusion,
consider a version of their quantitative risk sharing index, applied to the logarithms of the
IMRSs in our structural model (m∗f,t = lnM
∗
f,t and md,t = lnMd,t). The index is based on





Given our discussion in Section 4.2, it is clear that to base a risk sharing measure on RSI,
one must assume that preferences across goods are identical across locations. In other words,
13The index is the same as the correlation between m∗ft and mdt when they have the same variance,




one has to rule out the second column of Table 1 to make the calculation meaningful. This
unstated assumption is implicit in their calculation.
Brandt, Cochrane, and Santa-Clara (2006) appeal to Hansen-Jagannathan bounds in
order to avoid structurally modeling m∗f,t and md,t. In particular, they note that using
asset market data they can project M∗f,t and Md,t onto common vectors of asset returns
(denominated in real foreign and domestic currency, respectively). We denote the logs of
these projections as m̂∗f,t = ln M̂
∗
f,t and m̂d,t = ln M̂d,t. If we assume that var(m
∗
f,t) ≥
var(m̂∗f,t) and var(md,t) ≥ var(m̂d,t) then we can put a lower bound on RSI:14




Of course, m∗f,t and md,t remain in the numerator in Eq. (36). In our model m
∗
f,t−md,t =
ξt + xt, where ξt = ln Ξt and xt = lnXt. We can treat xt as measurable without a model,
given data on consumer price indices and the nominal exchange rate. But ξt is not directly
observable. To get around this issue Brandt, Cochrane, and Santa-Clara (2006) again appeal
to the projections, m̂∗f,t and m̂d,t, and argue that m̂
∗
ft − m̂d,t = xt always holds, even when





The advantage of Brandt, Cochrane, and Santa-Clara's measure is that m̂∗f,t, m̂d,t and xt can
be constructed using nothing more than data on asset returns and real exchange rates, and
a minimal appeal to asset pricing theory in forming the projections. The problem, however,
is that, unlike RSI, RSIBCS is not a lower bound for RSI. To make RSIBCS meaningful as a
lower bound for RSI we have to assume that asset markets are complete, so that ξt = 0. In
other words, we have to rule out the second column and the second row of Table 1.
One interpretation of RSIBCS is that var(xt)/[var(m̂
∗
f,t)+var(m̂d,t)] = 1−RSIBCS provides
an upper bound on the amount of risk that is not shared due only to goods market frictions.
Of course, this calculation still requires that we assume away preference dierences across
the agents. It also abstracts from any covariance there might be between xt and ξt.
Clearly, however, RSIBCS is silent on the amount of risk that is not shared due to asset
14While var(M∗f,t) ≥ var(M̂∗f,t) and var(Md,t) ≥ var(M̂d,t), it does not necessarily follow that var(m∗f,t) ≥
var(m̂∗f,t) and var(md,t) ≥ var(m̂d,t). This assumption is useful for intuition, but our argument does not
hinge on it.
15As we showed in Section 3.2, in general m̂∗f,t − m̂d,t 6= xt.
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market incompleteness (the ξt component). This issue brings us back to a problem we
highlighted in the section on reduced form models. These models are silent about dierences
between agents. Consistent with our main message in Sections 13, asset returns, alone, can
provide useful information about how much risk is shared (via Hansen-Jagannathan bounds),
but any measure of the degree of risk sharing also requires a measure of the amount of
unshared risk. Likewise, any measure of the correlation between agents' IMRSs also requires
a measure of ξt. Of course, one is always free to introspect, as Brandt, Cochrane, and Santa-
Clara (2006) do in Sec. 3.5 of their paper, on how much unshared risk seems reasonable.
Our view is that this introspection is merely speculative if additional data and theory are not
brought into the picture. Additionally, this introspection is not informed by exchange rates
and applies equally well to agents living in the same economy, who face the same prices.
4.4 Observational Equivalence
In this section, we use a more specic model to highlight the fact that fundamentally dierent
models of real exchange rates can be observationally equivalent at the level of aggregate
consumption data. The model is similar to the one in Backus and Smith (1993), in being
an endowment economy, with two agents, two periods, and two goods. As above, we allow
preferences across individual goods to vary across agents in the two economies. The utility

















1−θf . Given these assumptions, it is
straightforward to solve for the dynamics of the real exchange rate for a number of dierent
variants of the model, as shown in the Online Appendix.
When assets markets are complete, representative agents in the two economies have
dierent preferences over two individual goods, and trade in goods is frictionless, we have
ln (cd,t/cd,t−1) = θd lnG
1
t + (1− θd) lnG2t , and (38a)
ln (cf,t/cf,t−1) = θf lnG
1
t + (1− θf ) lnG2t . (38b)
Here, G1t and G
2
t are, respectively, the gross growth rates of the global endowments of goods
1 and 2. Models of this type, which emphasize the role of dierent preferences over individual
goods, have been important workhorses in the modern exchange rate literature.16
Consider an alternative model, in which assets markets are complete, representative
16See, for example, Stockman (1980), Bekaert (1996), Stathopoulos (2017), or Colacito, Croce, Ho, and
Howard (2018).
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agents in two economies have identical preferences over the two goods, good 1 being friction-
lessly traded, but good 2 being nontraded. Then we have
ln (c̃d,t/c̃d,t−1) = θ ln G̃
1
t + (1− θ) ln g̃2dt , and (39a)
ln (c̃f,t/c̃f,t−1) = θ ln G̃
1
t + (1− θ) ln g̃2ft . (39b)
Here θ is the weight that the domestic and foreign agents have on good 1 in their utility
functions, c̃d,t and c̃f,t are the aggregate consumption levels in the domestic and foreign





respectively, the growth rates of the endowments of good 2 in the domestic and foreign
economies. Models that emphasize simple trade frictions have also played a prominent role
in the modern exchange rate literature.17
The two models are observationally equivalent for the real exchange rate when they are
observationally equivalent with respect to aggregate consumption. As an example, we can






(θd − θ) lnG1t + (1− θd) lnG2t
]
/ (1− θ) , and (40b)
ln g̃2f,t =
[
(θf − θ) lnG1t + (1− θf ) lnG2t
]
/ (1− θ) . (40c)
With these assumptions, the two models have the same consumption growth rates and real
exchange rate:
lnXt = ln (cd,t/cd,t−1)− ln (cf,t/cf,t−1) ,






ln g̃2d,t − ln g̃2f,t
)
. (41)
The implication of this example is that an econometrician would not be able to discern which
mechanism is more relevant without looking at consumption and endowments at the level
of individual goods. The two models are also very dierent in terms of risk sharing. In
one model, risk is shared perfectly, and only global endowments matter. When the global
endowment of good 1 rises faster than that of good 2 and the foreign agent puts more
weight on good 1, its relative abundance means the real exchange rate falls.18 In the other
17See, for example, for example, Backus and Smith (1993), Tesar (1993), Stockman and Tesar (1995) or
Ready, Roussanov, and Ward (2017).
18In fact, this model is equivalent to a model of a single representative agent whose preference weight is a
weighted average of θd and θf . The equilibrium price of good 2 is identical. The real exchange rate can be
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model, risk sharing is imperfect when the endowment growth rates for good 2 dier across
countries. If the foreign agent's endowment of good 2 grows faster, this makes his basket
relatively abundant, and the real exchange rate falls.
It should also be clear, of course, that if one were to estimate these structural models
using only the pricing equations expressed in terms of consumption aggregates, it would be
impossible to distinguish between model variants in which (i) asset markets are complete
or incomplete, (ii) agents have the same or dierent preferences over individual goods, and
(iii) trade in goods is frictionless or not. A direct test of the model based on Eq. (34), à la
Backus and Smith (1993) would face the same problem.
This is not to say that it is impossible to distinguish between models with imperfect
or perfect risk sharing. We simply have to look beyond their implications for asset pricing
equations and the joint behavior of aggregate consumption and exchange rates to nd their
predictions for individual goods or categories of goods. While this is not possible in cases
where only the behavior of the consumption aggregate is modeledfor example, Verdelhan
(2010), Colacito and Croce (2011), or Bansal and Shaliastovich (2013)it is possible for
the models cited above, in which preference dierences are specied over individual tradable
goods, or in which there are specic trade frictions over some goods.
5 Conclusion
Hansen and Jagannathan (1991) oer a powerful tool for constructing a lower bound on the
variation of all agents' IMRSs. Their lower bound is constructed from a reduced-form SDF,
which can be thought of as a common component of all agents' IMRSs, and relies only on
asset return data and the assumption of no-arbitrage. Unfortunately, reduced-form SDFs,
combined with asset return and exchange rate data, cannot be used in the same way to
identify economically meaningful dierences between agents' IMRSs.
Our positive message is that structural models  with explicit assumptions about prefer-
ences over goods, goods market frictions, or asset market imperfections  are necessary, and
useful, to address specic questions about real exchange rate determination and risk sharing.
We are certainly not the rst to recognize this point. An early example is Backus and Smith
(1993), who examine the possibility that non-traded goods may account for several striking
features of international macroeconomic data. In order to focus on this friction in the goods
replicated by dening it as the relative price of two dierent baskets of good 1 and good 2. See the Online
Appendix.
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market, they assumed away frictions in the asset market (frictionless asset trading and com-
plete markets). Their approach is in line with our main point. When the asset market view
of exchange rates holds, variation in the real exchange rate only reects frictions and/or
preferences dierences in the goods market. It does not reect heterogeneity across agents
in dierent economies in the compensation for risk they require to own various assets such
as currencies.
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Online Appendix
In this appendix we outline an example of a full-edged model of an endowment economy
that is consistent with the discussion in Section 4 of the paper. The model is based on
Backus and Smith (1993), and we use it to illustrate how aggregate consumption levels and
the real exchange rate are jointly determined in equilibrium.
To make our notation compact we dene the n × 1 vectors cd = (c1d, c2d, · · · , cnd), cf =
(c1f , c
2
f , · · · , cnf ), P d = (1, P 2d , · · · , P nd ) and P f = (1, P 2f , · · · , P nf ). We use a version of the
model in which there are two periods, with time indexed by t = 0, 1. In the most general
version of the model, asset markets are assumed to be incomplete, but we also explore a
complete markets version of the model, as well as one with specic assumptions about the
utility functions and consumption aggregators.
We assume that there are k assets with k × 1 random payo vector Z(ω) in period 1,
where ω ∈ Ω represents the state of the world in period 1, which has probability π(ω). We
assume that k is smaller than the number of states of the world, which is assumed to be
nite. The k × 1 price vector for these assets in period 0 is PZ . The payos and prices of
the assets are measured in units of good 1.






P d,0 · cd,0 + PZ · ad = P d,0 · yd,0 , (43)
P d,1(ω) · cd,1(ω) = P d,1(ω) · yd,1(ω) +Z(ω) · ad , ω ∈ Ω. (44)
Here 0 < β < 1, cd,0 is the agent's consumption vector at time 0, yd,0 is an n × 1 vector
of her endowments of the goods at time 0, cd,1(ω) are her plans for future consumption (in
every possible state of the world), yd,1(ω) are her future endowments (in every possible state
of the world), and ad is a k × 1 vector whose ith element is her net purchases of asset i.
Similarly, the foreign agent chooses cf,0, {cf,1(ω)}ω∈Ω, and af to maximize
u[cf (cf,0)] + β
∑
ω∈Ω
u{cf [cf,1(ω)]}π(ω) , (45)
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subject to
P f,0 · cf,0 + PZ · af = P f,0 · yf,0 . (46)
P f,1(ω) · cf,1(ω) = P f,1(ω) · yf,1(ω) +Z(ω) · af , ω ∈ Ω. (47)
For simplicity, we assume that each good is either frictionlessly traded across economies
or is not traded across economies. The market clearing conditions for any frictionlessly














f,1(ω) , ω ∈ Ω. (49)














f,1(ω) , ω ∈ Ω. (51)
The market clearing condition in the asset market is
ad + af = 0 . (52)
Denition. A competitive equilibrium is a set of vectors of quantities cd,0, cf,0, {cd,1(ω)}ω∈Ω,
{cf,1(ω)}ω∈Ω, ad, af , and prices P d,0, P f,0, {P d,1(ω)}ω∈Ω, {P f,1(ω)}ω∈Ω, PZ such that the
quantities solve the agents' optimization problems (taking the prices as given), and such that
the market clearing conditions are satised. The law of one price must hold for any good
that is frictionlessly traded.












µd(ω)Z (ω) . (55)
Here λd is the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint (43), and µd(ω) is the Lagrange multiplier
on the constraint (44).
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µf (ω)Z (ω) . (58)
Here λf is the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint (46), and µf (ω) is the Lagrange multi-
plier on the constraint (47).
Consider the rst order conditions for the numeraire good in periods 0 and 1. If we


















, ω ∈ Ω. (60)
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When asset markets are complete we can assume that there is a complete set of state con-
tingent claims. That is, we can assume that there are k states of the world (just as there
are k assets) and that the payo on asset i in state ω = i is 1 and is zero otherwise.19 This
means that Eqs. (55) and (58) are equivalent to
PZλd = µd , (66)
PZλf = µf , (67)
where µd = [µd(1), . . . , µd(k)] and µf = [µf (1), . . . , µf (k)]. This means that when asset







Consequently, when asset markets are complete, we have the result that Ξ(ω) = 1 for all ω,
M jf (ω)
M jd(ω)
= Ξ(ω) = 1, (69)











for any nontraded good.
19To see this, suppose that there are k states of the world. We can arrange the payo vectors in a matrix
Z whose ith row is Z(i)′. If asset markets are complete the matrix Z is invertible. This means that
P̃Z = (Z−1)′PZ is the price vector corresponding to a set of state contingent claims that can be formed as
portfolios of the original assets. The contingent claim for state ω is equivalent to a portfolio of the original
assets with the portfolio weights being given by the ωth column of Z−1.
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Price Indices and the Real Exchange Rate
Given a particular set of prices for the individual goods, we can solve the domestic agent's
static expenditure minimization problem
min
cd,1
P d · cd subject to cd = cd(cd) . (71)
Because cd(·) is a homogenous of degree one function, minimized expenditure is equal to
Pdcd where Pd = Hd(P d), with Hd(·) also being homogenous of degree one in its arguments,
and having a form related to the function cd(·) (see Varian, 1984). Similarly, the foreign
price index is Pf = Hf (P f ). Since all prices are measured in the same numeraire, the real
exchange rate is e ≡ Pf/Pd.
In the special case where cd(·) = cf (·), we have Hd(·) = Hf (·). If, additionally, all
goods are frictionlessly traded, e = 1. If preferences dier across countries and all goods are













· cd,1(ω)]π(ω) = [cd,1(ω) · P d,1(ω)]µd(ω) , ω ∈ Ω.
Because cd,0 ·P d,0 = cd,0Pd,0, cd,1(ω) ·P d,1(ω) = cd,1(ω) · Pd,1(ω), and cd(·) is homogenous of
degree 1, this means we can rewrite these two Eqs. as
uc[cd(cd,0)] = Pd,0λd,
βuc{cd[cd,1(ω)]}π(ω) = Pd,1(ω)µd(ω) , ω ∈ Ω.









, ω ∈ Ω. (72)
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Similarly, for the foreign agent, the IMRS over aggregate consumption is








, ω ∈ Ω. (73)
We use the ∗ notation for the foreign agent to emphasize that the agents' consumption
aggregators are dierent.





















Letting X(ω) = e1(ω)/e0 we can rewrite Eq. (74) as
M∗f (ω)
Md(ω)
= X(ω)Ξ(ω) . (75)
A Specic Model Under Complete Markets
We adopt the following assumptions: (1) There are two goods, 1 and 2, with good 1 being









1−θf . These assumptions imply that the CPIs in the two countries,
measured in units of good 1, are
Pd = ρd (P
2
d )




with ρd = θ
−θd
d (1− θd)θd−1, and ρf = θ
−θf





1−θd ] . (77)
We discuss two specic examples of our model, which assume, alternatively, that good 2
is frictionlessly traded or nontraded. We use the following notation, and henceforth drop the
notational dependence of time 1 variables on ω unless it is needed. The global endowment




ft, j = 1, 2. The growth rates of the global endowments
of good j is Gj = Y j1 /Y
j












f,0, j = 1, 2.









1(ω)π(ω), j = 1, 2, denote the domestic agent's expected shares
of the global endowments in period 1.
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d,0 = λd , (78)












π(ω) = P 2d,1(ω)µd(ω) , ω ∈ Ω. (81)
PZ(ω)λd = µd(ω) , ω ∈ Ω. (82)
θf/c
1
f,0 = λf , (83)












π(ω) = P 2f,1(ω)µf (ω) , ω ∈ Ω. (86)
PZ(ω)λf = µf (ω) , ω ∈ Ω. (87)

































Both Goods are Frictionlessly Traded. When both goods are frictionlessly traded, we






















To solve the model we let eliminate unknowns by solving for them in terms of the domestic






d,0. We denote the foreign










while Eqs. (83) and (84) imply that Ff = λ
−1
d . These results together with Eqs. (82) and
(82) allow us to rewrite Eqs. (78)(81) and (83)(86) as
c1d,0 = θdFd. (93)
c2d,0P
2




Fd , ω ∈ Ω. (95)
c2d,1(ω)P
2
1 (ω) = β(1− θd)
π(ω)
PZ(ω)
Fd , ω ∈ Ω. (96)
c1f,0 = θfFf . (97)
c2f,0P
2




Ff , ω ∈ Ω. (99)
c2f,1(ω)P
2
1 (ω) = β(1− θf )
π(ω)
PZ(ω)
Ff , ω ∈ Ω. (100)
If we substitute these results into the market clearing conditions we get






(θdFd + θfFf ) = Y
1
1 (ω) (102)










Y 10 − θdFd
)
(105)
Eqs. (103) and (105)
P 20 =

















Eq. (104), (103) and (107) imply








P 20 . (108)
Because the price of good 2 is the same in both economies, from Eq. (77) we can see that the
logarithm of the real exchange rate in each period is just ln e = ln(ρf/ρd) + (θd− θf ) ln(P 2).
Hence, from Eq. (108), the log change in the real exchange rate is
lnX(ω) = (θf − θd) ln[G2(ω)/G1(ω)] . (109)
All that remains is to solve for Fd. We can do this by substituting Eqs. (93)(96) into





































1) + (1− θf )(s20 + βs̄21)
θf (1 + β) + (θd − θf )(s20 + βs̄21)
Y 10 (111)
By substitution of this result into Eqs. (105) and (106), we get
Ff =
θd[(1− s10) + β(1− s̄11)] + (1− θd)[(1− s20) + β(1− s̄21)]
θf (1 + β) + (θd − θf )(s20 + βs̄21)
Y 10 (112)
P 20 =
(1− θf )(1 + β) + (θf − θd)(s10 + βs̄11)




Given the form of the utility function, domestic aggregate consumption growth is




d,0] + (1− θd) ln[c2d,1(ω)/c2d,0]. (114)
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2(ω) , ω ∈ Ω. (116)
Hence, Eq. (114) can be rewritten as
ln[cd,1(ω)/cd,0] = θd lnG
1(ω) + (1− θd) lnG2(ω). (117)
Similarly, for the foreign agent, aggregate consumption growth is
ln[cf,1(ω)/cf,0] = θf lnG
1(ω) + (1− θf ) lnG2(ω). (118)
One Good is Not Traded. We now assume that it is not possible to trade good 2 between
the two economies. Thus, we replace the market clearing conditions for good 2, (91) and















We also assume, as in the main text, that θd = θf = θ. After noting that the price of good 2
now requires a location subscript, if we substitute Eqs. (93)(100) into the market clearing
conditions we get






θ(Fd + Ff ) = Y
1
1 (ω) (122)
(1− θ)Fd/P 2d,0 = y2d,0 (123)












0 /θ − Fd (127)
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(1− θ)[Y 10 /θ − Fd]
y2f,0
(129)





Eqs. (125), (123) and (130) imply









Eqs. (126), (124) and (130) imply









Because agents have the same preferences, from Eq. (77) we can see that the logarithm of
the real exchange rate in each period is ln e = (1 − θ) ln(P 2f /P 2d ). Hence, from Eqs. (131)
and (132) the log change in the real exchange rate is
lnX(ω) = (1− θ)[ln g2d(ω)− ln g2f (ω)] . (133)
All that remains is to solve for Fd. In the lifetime budget constraint, Eq. (88), if we use
Eqs. (119) and (120), the terms involving the nontraded good cancel out from either side of




t , to rewrite Eq.
(88) as






















By substitution of this result into Eqs. (127), (128) and (129) we get
Ff =





















Given the form of the utility function, domestic aggregate consumption growth is




d,0] + (1− θ) ln[c2d,1(ω)/c2d,0]. (139)









d(ω) , ω ∈ Ω. (141)
Hence, Eq. (139) can be rewritten as
ln[cd,1(ω)/cd,0] = θ lnG
1(ω) + (1− θ) ln g2d(ω). (142)
Similarly, for the foreign agent, aggregate consumption growth is
ln[cf,1(ω)/cf,0] = θ lnG
1(ω) + (1− θ) ln g2f (ω). (143)
A Representative Agent Model. We now consider a model with a single representative
agent whose preferences have the same functional form as in the previous examples, and
whose endowments correspond to the global endowments of the two goods. The agent also
has access to a complete set of state contingent claims. Letting F be the agent's expenditure
on consumption in period 0, and letting θ be the weight on good 1 in the utility function,
we can write the rst order conditions as
c10 = θF. (144)
c20P
2





F , ω ∈ Ω. (146)
c21(ω)P
2
1 (ω) = β(1− θ)
π(ω)
PZ(ω)
F , ω ∈ Ω. (147)















1 (ω), so it follows immediately from the
rst order conditions that F = Y 10 /θ, P
2
0 = (1− θ)Y 10 /(θY 20 ), P 21 (ω) = (1− θ)Y 11 /(θY 21 ), and
PZ(ω) = βπ(ω)/G
1(ω). The price of a state contingent claim against state ω is the same as







The level of the price of good 2 at time 0 is also the same as in the two agent model if the




(1− θf )(1 + β) + (θf − θd)(s10 + βs̄11)
θf (1 + β) + (θd − θf )(s20 + βs̄21)
. (149)














which are the same expressions we had for both agents in the two agent model.
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